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We analyze the effect of liquidated damage rules in exclusive contracts 
that are negotiated in a sequential bargaining process between one seller 
and two buyers with endogenous outside options. We show that assumptions 
on the distribution of bargaining power influence the size of the payment 
of damages and determine which contractual party benefits from 
including liquidated damage rules. Furthermore, we show that the effect 
of the payment of damages on the efficiency of the consummated deals 
depends on the possibility to sign more than one contract. Only if this 
is not possible, damage rules may prevent the breaking and entering of 
contracts and thus lead to inefficient deals in the market of corporate control, 
or allow for ‘naked’ exclusion in the context of supplier contracts with 
externalities. 
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In many situations two parties bargain over a contract (letter of intent, memo-
randum of understanding, preliminary agreement) that governs a transaction at
a later point in time. Negotiations over real estate, mergers or bankruptcy asset
purchases are typical examples, where actual ownership is transferred at a later
stage, often after other oﬀers have been considered and a third party (notary,
shareholders, regulators, courts) has aﬃrmed the agreement. Usually in these
circumstances a contracting party can withdraw from the deal after its conclu-
sion. In practice, the possibility that a party may wish to withdraw from the
current contract to sign a better deal with some other party is recognized by
provisions for payment of damages. “Damages under common law are frequently
compensatory in the sense that they exactly compensate for breach; i.e., they
leave the breached-against partner in the same ﬁnancial position as before the
breach. As an alternative to externally determined damages, parties to a con-
tract may write damage rules into the contract itself. Such provisions are called
liquidated damage rules” (Diamond and Maskin (1979), p.283).
The theoretical literature on the eﬀect of diﬀerent damage rules is subdivided
into two branches, each relating to a speciﬁc context, that evolved almost inde-
pendently over the past 30 years.
In one branch of the literature, payments for damages are discussed in the
context of breach of production or supplier contracts with externalities. Diamond
and Maskin (1979) study rather generally the eﬀect of diﬀerent damages rules on
equilibrium search and breach behavior, when individuals in a contract may wish
to continue search to ﬁnd a better match on the market. They ﬁnd that when
damages are determined endogenously by the parties (liquidated damages), these
privately stipulated damages can be higher than compensatory damages and the
parties enjoy some power over potential contract partners. In combination with
exclusive dealing agreements Aghion and Bolton (1987) show that an incumbent
may be able to use such a contract as a barrier to entry (resulting in ‘naked’
exclusion), or at least as a means to extract surplus from a more eﬃcient entrant.
More recently Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) consider exclusive contracts with
exogenous (compensatory) damages under the assumption that buyers are either
independent or are competing against each other in a downstream market. In
this scenario contracts will always be breached in favor of a deal with a more
2eﬃcient entrant. With independent buyers the incumbent is indiﬀerent between
paying buyers for signing the exclusive contract and not oﬀering the contract in
the ﬁrst place. Eﬃcient entry is not prevented and the incumbent has no power.
With Bertrand competition among the buyers the incumbent proﬁts through the
damages for breach, while buyers end up being indiﬀerent between signing the
contract (and paying damages) or not signing. For procurement contracts Tirole
(1986) discusses the eﬀect of exogenous (compensatory) damages on investment
incentives in case that trade is observable and veriﬁable by third parties. He ob-
serves that compensatory damages inﬂuence the bargaining process by increasing
the investing party’s power. De Meza and Selvaggi (2007) come to similar conclu-
sions in a setting in which trade is non-contractible but where resale is possible.
They ﬁnd that liquidated damages may help to restore buyers’ investment incen-
tives by appropriately redistributing bargaining power between the contracting
parties. Reagan and Stulz (1993) discuss the establishment of a bond as one
possibility for parties to convince the other party that it will not default if future
spot prices are lower than the contract price it oﬀers, thus as a means to ensure
long-term contracts.
In another branch of the theoretical literature payments for damages are dis-
cussed in the context of the market for corporate control, where they are usu-
ally labeled ‘termination fees’. The theoretical literature on termination fees is
largely auction-related as surveyed by Roosevelt (2000) for bankruptcy sales and
by Boone and Mulherin (2007a) for mergers. Termination fees have been advo-
cated in this literature as a way to achieve some commitment in relationships
that are governed by sequential renegotiations. In these contributions, which
are discussed in more detail in Section 4, the damages are compensatory as the
size of the fee is assumed to be exogenously determined. Empirically, liquidated
damage rules have mostly been studied in the context of mergers (e.g., by Oﬃcer
(2003)), where Boone and Mulherin (2007a) ﬁnd that up to 79 per cent of merger
pre-contracts include such termination fees.
We aim to contribute to both strands of the theoretical literature by focus-
ing on the process by which payments for damages are determined. We thereby
identify the implicit assumptions of the above literature concerning the contrac-
tual framework that drive some of the main results. For both strands we show
that the eﬀect of the payment of damages on the eﬃciency of the consummated
deals depends on the possibility to sign more than one contract (among other
3determinants). Only if this is not possible, damage rules may prevent eﬃcient
deals in the market of corporate control, or allow for ‘naked’ exclusion in the
context of supplier contracts with externalities. Furthermore, we show that in
both strands assumptions on the distribution of bargaining power inﬂuence the
size of the payment of damages and determine which contractual party beneﬁts
from including liquidated damage rules.
In our approach payments for damages are endogenous and an outcome of
a negotiation process between parties with diﬀerent bargaining power under the
assumption that alternative deals present an outside option.1 More speciﬁcally,
we analyze two-stage negotiations between one seller and two consecutive buyers,
where the seller can withdraw from an exclusive contract by paying liquidated
damages to the respective buyer. The agreement of the ﬁrst stage serves as an
outside option in the second-stage negotiations, and vice versa. Analogously to
Shaked and Sutton (1984), we assume that, following any oﬀer by the seller, the
‘insider’ buyer can always reply with a counter-oﬀer before the seller switches
over to negotiate with an outsider buyer.
In a ﬁrst scenario we assume that contracts are exclusive, but, unlike Shaked
and Sutton (1984), we also assume that more than one contract can be signed,
such that a breach of contract leads to payment of liquidated damages in equi-
librium. This implies that the seller can return to the ﬁrst buyer even if an
agreement is reached with the outside buyer. In this case, exclusion of more eﬃ-
cient buyers is not possible and a less eﬃcient buyer can use liquidated damage
rules in an exclusive contract only to extract a rent from a more eﬃcient agree-
ment. In equilibrium, the seller accepts liquidated damage rules in exchange for
a greater share of gains of trade.
Hence, when we allow for sequential negotiations, in extension to the results
of Diamond and Maskin (1979), Aghion and Bolton (1987), and Simpson and
Wickelgren (2007), exclusivity agreements in combination with liquidated damage
rules are not suﬃcient to exclude more eﬃcient buyers.
In a second scenario we assume a more rigid form of exclusivity, i.e., that only
1Aghion and Bolton (1987) consider endogenous termination fees when the seller makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. Diamond and Maskin (1979) consider exogenous damages and assume
that the surplus is split equally. Simpson and Wickelgreen (2007) consider exogenous damages
and assume that the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. De Meza and Selvaggi (2007)
consider a bargaining setting with resale in which the surplus is split equally, and brieﬂy discuss
endogenous damages.
4one contract can be signed at a time because of additional contractual restrictions,
as, e.g., no-shop clauses.2 Here, ‘naked’ exclusion of more eﬃcient buyers is
possible. Liquidated damages rules allow the less eﬃcient ﬁrst-stage buyer to
protect a deal against more eﬃcient buyers. From the perspective of the seller,
even a deal with the less eﬃcient buyer (protected by liquidated damages and a
no-shop clause) can be optimal, provided it is negotiated ﬁrst.
Moreover, our bargaining approach applies to more general settings. Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990) and, more generally, Houba and Bennett (1997) showed
that under simultaneous bargaining between a seller and two buyers, competition
between the buyers has no eﬀect on the equilibrium price, if the seller can threaten
to opt out. For a sequential negotiation process in which the price as well as liqui-
dated damages are negotiated simultaneously, we show that the equilibrium price
is above the simultaneous outcome. Further, this result of our model explains
the use of no-shop clauses in contracts, provides a rationale for pre-contracts, and
for deals with less eﬃcient buyers, as our application to mergers and acquisitions
also illustrates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model and its results.
Section 3 analyzes no-shop clauses as an additional contractual agreement. In
Section 4 we apply our results to the context of mergers. Section 5 summarizes
and concludes.
2 A bargaining model for contracts with liqui-
dated damage rules
A seller S of a single indivisible commodity and a reservation price πS = 0
sequentially meets two buyers, denoted B1 and B2, with reservations prices π1 >
0, and π2 > 0 respectively. The negotiations with a buyer Bi are over a contract
(xi,ti) that speciﬁes the selling price xi and liquidated damages ti ≥ 0. Liquidated
damages ti have to be paid from seller S to buyer Bi in case the seller wants to
execute a contract with the other buyer Bj after having signed a contract with
Bi with i  = j. We assume that any oﬀer (xi,ti) at both stages i = 1,2 is a
combination of xi and ti that cannot be accepted or rejected independently of
2For a deﬁnition of no-shop clauses see Section 3.
5each other.3 All payments from a potential agreement will be paid out after the
last stage.
We assume that the bargaining process at both stages can be described by
the alternating oﬀers procedure suggested by Rubinstein (1982). We assume that
at time 0 the seller S makes an oﬀer (x1,t1) to the buyer B1 with probability
λ1 ∈ [0,1], which is a proposal of a division of the surplus. Analogously to
Shaked and Sutton (1984) we assume that once a player receives an oﬀer from
the other player, he can take one of the following three actions: he can accept
the oﬀer, implying that the agreement is struck and that the players divide the
surplus according to the accepted oﬀer, or he can reject the oﬀer and make a
counter-oﬀer at time ∆ > 0. If this counter-oﬀer is accepted by the ﬁrst player
then the agreement is struck, otherwise the ﬁrst player makes another counter-
counter-oﬀer at time 2∆. This process of oﬀers and counter-oﬀers continues until
a player accepts an oﬀer. Thirdly, a player can reject an oﬀer and decide to
leave the negotiation table to take up a (potential) outside option, in which case
the negotiations end in disagreement. Ending the negotiations in this way is
understood as a strategic decision.4
After the negotiations at the ﬁrst stage (which end in disagreement because
the seller opted out, or in agreement with an accepted oﬀer), the seller may have
the opportunity to bargain with another buyer B2 at the second stage, according
to the same procedure. The probability that the seller makes an oﬀer in these
negotiations is λ2 ∈ [0,1]. Thus, we assume that the possibility to make a deal
at the second stage gives the seller an outside option at the ﬁrst stage and vice
versa. For simplicity and without loss of generality we assume that all players’
disagreement payoﬀs are zero.
In case the bargaining process at any stage ended in agreement, the outcome is
a contract (xi,ti) specifying a share of xi for the seller, and πi −xi for the buyer,
and liquidated damages ti that have to be paid to buyer Bi in case the seller
decides for the contract with Bj, with i,j = 1,2 and i  = j. In case of perpetual
3This assumption relates to the model of ‘multi-issue’ bargaining as analyzed by Fershtman
(1990). In our setting, however, the surpluses of the two items never coexist. Either the deal
is struck and ownership will be transferred, or the deal will be broken and the termination fee
will be paid.
4In Rubinstein’s original approach a player has only two actions to choose from: he can only
reject or accept an oﬀer (with the same consequences as before) and may receive a disagreement
payoﬀ if negotiations end in disagreement or break down for some exogenous reason. We discuss
the implications of this possibility in the conclusion.
6disagreement the utility vector is (0,0,0). At the last stage, the seller decides for
one of the two contracts. The sequence of decisions is depicted in Figure 1, where
it is indicated with (S/Bi) if the seller makes an oﬀer, with (Bi/S) if buyer Bi
makes an oﬀer, with “y” if a player accepts an oﬀer, with “n” if a player rejects
an oﬀer, and with “nn” if a player rejects and opts out. We deﬁne N′ as the game
which begins immediately following an oﬀer by the “insider”, and where the S
is free at this time to switch to the outsider. Note that the game immediately
following a switch by the ﬁrm is the same as our initial game; we label this game
N.
[insert Figure 1 here]
Note that we assume that the seller can switch from one buyer to the other,
but that he can only return to a buyer with which he has not yet signed a contract
already. This implies that M′ is analogous to M, with the diﬀerence that B1 is
the “insider”.5 We apply backward induction to characterize the equilibrium
oﬀers of all players. At the ﬁnal stage, seller S chooses the larger of the two oﬀers
xi with i = 1,2. Denote a decision for x1 as q = 1, and a decision for x2 as
q = 0. The utility vectors (uS,uB1,uB2) are (x1,π1 − x1 − t2,t2) if q = 1, and
(x2,t1,π2 − x2 − t1) if q = 0.
2.1 Bargaining at the second stage
Suppose that there exists a contract between S and B1 in Stage 1, specifying x1
and t1 (node M in Figure 1). In their negotiations, buyer B2 and S anticipate
that seller S in Stage 3 will decide between the two contracts and choose the
higher of the two oﬀers.
The seller can guarantee to get the payoﬀ x1 by opting out when he has the
option (after an oﬀer by B2). He can also secure (practically) x1 by oﬀering the
buyer a small compensation ε to ensure his accepting the oﬀer, he himself will then
get x1 −ε, and the utilities at node M will be uS = x1 −ε/2,uB2 = ε/2,uB1 = t1.
5Analogous to Shaked and Sutton (1984) the seller can switch between buyers, but diﬀerent
to their model, we assume that negotiations can continue after one agreement has been struk.
The game ends when both agreements are struck or gains of trade in one of the negotiations
are zero.
7Thus, in any equilibrium, S should get at least x1. But if B2 wishes to have a deal
with S he should be able to give him at least x1 + t1, so that the seller receives
at least x1 after paying liquidated damages t1 to the other buyer. This is only
possible if π2 ≥ x1 + t1.
When it is the seller who makes an oﬀer he would be better oﬀ securing
the buyer’s agreement by giving him his continuation value δb2 and cashing the
diﬀerence (after paying the compensation t1 to B1): π2−δb2−t1. We will conﬁrm
later under which circumstances this is indeed better than having a deal with B1
and paying compensation t2, or indeed simply continuing the negotiations with
B2 (thus securing δx2 for himself). Here the seller gets π2 − δb2 − t1, and the
buyer gets δb2.
When it is the buyer who makes the oﬀer there could be two cases, depending
on whether the oﬀer of the ﬁrst stage negotiation x1 is larger or smaller than δx2.
a) δx2 > x1 : The buyer gives the seller δx2 + t1, of which the seller gets δx2
net, and the buyer takes the diﬀerence π2 − δx2 − t1.
b) δx2 ≤ x1 : The buyer gives the seller x1 + t1, of which the seller gets x1
net, and the buyer takes the diﬀerence π2 − x1 − t1.
Further below we will show under which circumstances this is better than ei-
ther receiving a compensation t2, or not having at deal at all, or simply continuing
the negotiations with S (thus securing δb2 for himself).
Depending on the ﬁrst stage contract (x1,t1), the equations to determine the





λ2(π2 − δb2 − t1) + (1 − λ2)δx2 if δx2 > x1
λ2(π2 − δb2 − t1) + (1 − λ2)x1 if δx2 ≤ x1
and if q = 0






λ2δb2 + (1 − λ2)(π2 − δx2 − t1) if δx2 > x1
λ2δb2 + (1 − λ2)(π2 − x1 − t1) if δx2 ≤ x1
and if q = 0
t2 if q = 1
(2)
Simultaneously, the seller and the buyer B2 negotiate over liquidated damages
t2 that will be paid to buyer B2 in case the seller decides for x1 at Stage 3
(q = 1), after having reached an agreement with B2 at Stage 2. Anticipating the
sequence of decisions, the seller might have been able to negotiate a higher oﬀer
at Stage 1 due to the fact that the Stage 2 contract represented a relevant outside
8option. We assume that the diﬀerence between the oﬀers that buyer B1 receives
at the ﬁrst stage with and without an outside option represents the surplus of
the liquidated damages negotiations.6 In the case of breach of the agreement
with B2, S receives x1 from B1 and B2 receives t2, provided that x2 represented
a relevant outside option in the ﬁrst stage negotiations. Without a contract with
B2, ﬁrst stage negotiations would have led to an oﬀer of ˜ x1. We will conﬁrm later




0 if q = 0




0 if q = 0
λ2δt2 + (1 − λ2)(x1 − δg2 − λ1π1) if q = 1
(4)
Equations (1) to (4) summarize the two interrelated bargaining situations. They
state that if the seller decides for a contract with buyer B1 at Stage 3, after
having signed an agreement with buyer B2, the latter receives t2, while the seller
receives x1 from buyer B1. Moreover, if the seller decides for a contract with B2
no liquidated damages will be paid to buyer B2.
To determine the equilibrium oﬀers, we will consider ﬁrst the situation in
which the ﬁrst stage oﬀer x1 is smaller than the seller’s continuation value, i.e.,
x1 < δx2. Suppose furthermore that π2 ≥ x1 + t1 holds. Obviously, this implies
that the seller will decide for B2 at the last stage (q = 0). Solving (1) to (4)
simultaneously for x2,b2,g2 and t2 leads to the following outcomes:
x2 = λ2(π2 − t1) and b2 = (1 − λ2)(π2 − t1),
g2 = t2 = 0.
With this solution the condition δx2 > x1 becomes δλ2(π2 − t1) > x1.
6While the exact speciﬁcation of the surplus for these negotiations will have an eﬀect on the
intervals in which speciﬁc equilibria exist, it does not change our overall ﬁndings qualitatively.
7While we assume here that liquidated damages are only included in the contract whenever
a buyer anticipates that the seller will decide for a contract with the other buyer, our results
generalize to the case in which liquidated damage rules are always speciﬁed, thus also when
in equilibrium the contract is not terminated. In equilibrium the buyers’ agreement to the
contracts, i.e. bi ≥ 0, restricts liquidated damages such that including them does not change
the outcome.
9Suppose now that the ﬁrst stage oﬀer x1 is larger than the seller’s continuation
value, i.e.,δx2 ≤ x1. The contract of Stage 1 now represents a relevant outside
option. If the players anticipate that seller S will decide for B2 at the last stage








(π2 − t1) and b2 =
1 − λ2
1 − λ2δ
(π2 − x1 − t1),
g2 = t2 = 0.
Substituting the solution into the condition leads to δλ2(π2 − t1) ≤ x1. If the
players anticipate q = 1, buyer B2 will ensure the seller’s agreement and at the
same time maximize liquidated damages, which leads to:
x2 = x1 and
t2 = (1 − λ2)(x1 − λ1π1),
g2 = λ2(x1 − λ1π1).
Suppose next that π2 < x1 + t1 holds. The surplus π2 is not large enough to
give S at least x1 after paying t1 to buyer B1. Buyer B2 would still prefer the
seller’s agreement, as he can ask for liquidated damages t2. He would therefore
oﬀer x2 = π2 − t1 and claim liquidated damages t2 = (1 − λ2)(x1 − λ1π1) as
speciﬁed above, while the seller decides for a contract with B1 (and hence q = 1).
Obviously, this solution will only be agreed upon by S and B2 in case t2 ≥ 0∧π2 <
x1 +t1 ⇔ π2 −t1 > λ1π1. If the second stage surplus is not suﬃciently large, the
seller will not sign an agreement with B2.
Hence, we can now summarize the second stage decisions at nodes M. The
8With δ = 1 the solution simpliﬁes to x2 = x1 and b2 = π2 − x1 − t1, and g2 = t2 = 0.







π2 if λ2(π2 − t1) ≤ x1 and λ1π1 + t1 ≤ π2 < π1 + t1
x1 if λ2(π2 − t1) ≤ x1 and π1 + t1 ≤ π2






(1 − λ2)(x1 − λ1π1) if q = 1,
0 else.
We thus obtain the outside option outcome: the payoﬀ of the seller is simply
the maximum of his outside option and what he can get if he never opts out.
Suppose ﬁnally that there exists no contract between S and B1 in Stage 1
(node N′), i.e. that the seller has no outside option yet. Both players will
anticipate decisions that will be characterized by (5), but with the indices for B1
and B2 reversed (node M′).9 If no gains of trade from (second time) negotiations
with B1 are anticipated, oﬀers at N′ are determined by simultaneously solving:
x2 = λ2(π2 − δb2) + (1 − λ2)δx2
b2 = λ2δb2 + (1 − λ2)(π2 − δx2)
which leads to x∗
2 = λ2π2, and will be the outcome if π1 < λ2π2.
2.2 Bargaining at the ﬁrst stage
In their negotiations, buyer B1 and S anticipate that the seller S at Stage 3
will decide between the two contracts, if he had signed both, and will choose
the higher of the two oﬀers. The players (at node N in Figure 1) also perfectly
anticipate the outcome of the second stage negotiations between S and B2 as
characterized above.
When it is the seller who makes an oﬀer, he would be better oﬀ securing
the buyer’s agreement by giving him his continuation value δb1 and cashing the
diﬀerence π1−δb1−t2 (after possibly paying the compensation t2 to B2 in case the
9Note that the game actually is a multi-stage game, because of the fact that the seller can
always return to a buyer with which he did not yet achieve an agreement. Applying backward
induction properly would ﬁrst require an analysis of the game starting at node M′. This game,
however, is strategically equivalent to the analysed game staring at node M but with Buyer B1
instead of Buyer B2.For convenience, to avoid redundancy and because of spatial constraints,
we skip the analysis of this game.
11seller ﬁnds it beneﬁcial to sign a second agreement in period 2). We will conﬁrm
further below under which conditions this is better than having a deal with B2
and paying compensation t1, or securing δx1 for himself by simply continuing the
negotiations with B1.
When it is the buyer who makes the oﬀer there could again be two cases:
a) δx1 ≤ x2 : The buyer B1 gives the seller x2 +t2, of which the seller gets x2
net, and the buyer takes the diﬀerence π1 − x2 − t2.
b) δx1 > x2 : The buyer B1 gives the seller δx1 + t2, of which the seller gets
δx1 net, and the buyer takes the diﬀerence π1 − δx1 − t2.
Again, we will conﬁrm later under which circumstances this is better than
either receiving a compensation t1, or not having at deal at all, or securing δb1
for himself by continuing the negotiations with S.
Anticipating (5) from the second stage means that the second stage negotia-
tions may represent a relevant outside option at the ﬁrst stage. Anticipating the
seller’s choice at Stage 3, the equations to determine the decisions on x1 and b1





x2 if q = 0
λ1(π1 − δb1 − t2) + (1 − λ1)x2 if δx1 ≤ x2
λ1(π1 − δb1 − t2) + (1 − λ1)δx1 if δx1 > x2






t1 if q = 0
λ1δb1 + (1 − λ1)(π1 − x2 − t2) if δx1 ≤ x2
λ1δb1 + (1 − λ1)(π1 − δx1 − t2) if δx1 > x2
if q = 1
(7)
Following the same reasoning as at the second stage, the seller and the buyer B1
simultaneously negotiate over liquidated damages t1 that would be paid to buyer
B1 in case the seller decides for x2 at Stage 3, after having reached an agreement
with B1 in Stage 1:
t1 =
 
λ1δt1 + (1 − λ1)(x2 − δg1 − λ2π2) if q = 0




λ1(x2 − δt1 − λ2π2) + (1 − λ1)δg1 if q = 0
0 if q = 1
(9)
We know from the analysis of Stage 2 that the second stage oﬀer will always be
12larger or equal to the ﬁrst stage oﬀer x1, unless we have π2 < π1 + t1. Note that
even when securing the seller’s agreement, the buyer B1 can not prevent that the
seller signs a second agreement at Stage 2.
i) To determine the equilibrium oﬀers at this stage, we will ﬁrst consider the
situation in which the second stage oﬀer x2 is larger than the seller’s continuation
value, i.e., δx1 ≤ x2. Moreover, suppose that δλ2(π2 − t1) ≤ x1 and that π2 ≥
x1 +t1 hold, such that x∗
2 = x1. Finally, suppose also that π1 ≥ x2+t2 holds. We
will relax each of these assumptions later on.
Along the seller’s decision at Stage 3, we need to distinguish two cases: Con-
sider ﬁrst the case that S decides for B1 at stage 3 (q = 1). From the analysis of
the second stage, i.e. (5) we know that this implies that t∗
2 = (1−λ2)(x1−λ1π1).
Substituting x2 and t2 accordingly and solving (6) to (9) simultaneously for the
ﬁrst-stage values x1,b1,t1 and g1 leads to:
x1 = α1π1 with α1 ≡
1 + (1 − λ2)λ1
2 − λ2
and b1 = g1 = t1 = 0





1 = α1π1 (10)
t
∗
2 = (1 − α1)π1 and t
∗
1 = 0.
Suppose next that still x∗
2 = x1 holds, but that S decides for B2 in Stage 3 (q = 0).
This implies t∗
2 = 0 and leads to:
x1 = α2π2 with α2 ≡
1 + (1 − λ1)λ2
2 − λ1
Substituting these solutions into Stage 2 leads to the following equilibrium oﬀers





2 = α2π2 (11)
t
∗
1 = (1 − α2)π2 and t
∗
2 = 0.
Given the seller’s third stage decision, he will prefer the contract with B1 if the




Hence, since we assumed x1 +t1 ≤ π2 as well as x2+t2 ≤ π1, (10) constitutes
an equilibrium, if
α1
α2π1 > π2 > α1π1 and (11) constitutes an equilibrium, if
α
−1
2 π1 > π2 >
α1
α2π1.
Now suppose that x1 + t1 > π2. Anticipating x∗
2 = π2 from the second stage,









2 = (1 − λ2)(π2 − λ1π1). (12)
As x2+t2 ≤ π1 also has to hold, (12) constitutes and equilibrium if α1π1 > π2.
In this case, buyer B1 will not oﬀer (11) but rather x1 = π2 as this is enough
to ensure the seller’s agreement and also to ensure that the seller decides for a
contract with B1 at Stage 3. Note that if π2 < λ1π1, buyer B2 does not represent
a relevant outside option in the ﬁrst stage negotiations, leading to t2 = 0.
Alternatively, suppose that π1 < x2 + t2 holds. B1 will not be able to oﬀer
(11). He will ensure the seller’s agreement such that he at least earns liquidated
damages t1, anticipating that the seller decides for a contract with B2 at Stage









1 = (1 − λ1)(π1 − λ2π2). (13)
Obviously, we need x1 + t1 ≤ π2 to hold, which implies that (13) constitutes an
equilibrium if α
−1
2 π1 < π2.
Note, furthermore, that λ
−1
2 π1 = π2 leads to liquidated damages of t1 = 0.
In this case, the surplus that is achievable with buyer B1 does not represent a
relevant outside option in the negotiations with buyer B2.
ii) Now suppose that δλ2(π2 − t1) > x1 holds such that x2 = λ2(π2 − t1). As
this implies that x1 < x2, it means that S decides for B2 at Stage 3 (q = 0).
10Note that for λi ∈ [0,1] we have αi ≤ 1 with i = 1,2. Furthermore, αi < αj for λi < λj.




14From (5) we know that t2 = 0. In this case, buyer B1 would like to maximize
liquidated damages t1. Solving (6)-(9) for δx1 ≤ x2 reveals that x2 > x1 can only
hold in case π1 < λ2π2, because otherwise B1 would prefer to oﬀer x1 = x2. As the
seller does not beneﬁt from the ﬁrst stage oﬀer, gains of trade for the liquidated
damages negotiations are zero, thus t1 = 0. Hence, if λ
−1
2 π1 < π2 there will be no
agreement on the ﬁrst stage and the seller will sign a contract with the second
buyer only, with x2 = λ2π2. Moreover, the seller will also not sign a contract with
the ﬁrst buyer at a later stage as there no gains of trade in case π1 < λ2π2.
iii) Finally consider the situation in which the second stage oﬀer x2 is smaller
than the seller’s continuation value, i.e., δx1 > x2. Given the second stage analy-
sis, it must be that λ1π1+t1 > π2, because this is the only situation for which B2
will not oﬀer at least x1. Solving equations (6)-(9) leads to x1 = λ1π1 and t1 = 0.
In this case, the surplus that is achievable with buyer B2 does not represent a
relevant outside option in the negotiations with buyer B1. Hence, the seller will
sign a contract with the ﬁrst buyer only, with x1 = π1λ1.
We can now summarize our ﬁndings and present the following result:
Proposition 1 Suppose realization of utilities is postponed until all stages are
completed. At the ﬁnal stage the seller will be confronted with the following
contracts:
(x1,t1) = (λ1π1,0) if 0 ≤ π2 < λ1π1;
(x1,t1) = (π2,0) and (x2,t2) = (π2,(1 − λ2)(π2 − λ1π1)) if λ1π1 ≤ π2 < α1π1;
(x1,t1) = (α1π1,0) and (x2,t2) = (α1π1,(1 − α1)π1) if α1π1 ≤ π2 <
α1
α2π1;
(x1,t1) = (α2π2,(1 − α2)π2) and (x2,t2) = (α2π2,0) if
α1
α2π1 ≤ π2 < α
−1
2 π1;
(x1,t1) = (π1,(1 − λ1)(π1 − λ2π2)) and (x2,t2) = (π1,0) if α
−1
2 π1 ≤ π2 < λ
−1
2 π1;
(x2,t2) = (λ2π2,0) if λ
−1
2 π1 ≤ π2.
In equilibrium the seller decides for the contract that speciﬁes ti = 0.
The proposition states that we need to distinguish six diﬀerent regions, as
exempliﬁed in Figure 2 for λ1 > λ2. We will discuss the result from the perspective
of the ﬁrst two bargaining partners. The ﬁrst contract in the proposition considers
the case in which the seller’s outside option is rather low in comparison with the
surplus of the ﬁrst deal. In this Region I the oﬀer is determined by the seller’s
15relative bargaining power. In Regions II and III the second-stage negotiations
provide the seller with a relevant outside option. The contracts will be signed at
both stages, the seller will decide for buyer B1 and will pay liquidated damages
to buyer B2 for providing him with an outside option. The diﬀerence between
Regions II and III is that in Region II the ﬁrst stage buyer B1 still makes a
positive proﬁt as the outside option is too low to allow the second stage buyer
to capture the full surplus. In Region III, however, b1 = 0. In Regions IV and
V the roles are reversed in the sense that the ﬁrst stage contract provides the
seller with a relevant outside option in the second stage negotiations. The seller
decides for the second stage oﬀer and pays liquidated damages to the ﬁrst stage
buyer. Finally, in Region VI, the seller’s outside option is so attractive that no
deal will be signed at the ﬁrst stage.
[insert Figure 2 here]
For a successful deal we can conclude that the larger the seller’s outside option
x2 for any given surplus π1 the higher the likelihood that liquidated damage rules
will exist (i.e. that the deal will be positioned in Region II to V). This is in line
with intuition since liquidated damages are only oﬀered when the outside option
is greater than the seller’s share of current surplus, determined by its bargaining





α2π1 in the proposition reveal that Regions I and VI are enlarged
(reduced) with an increase in the seller’s (buyers’s) bargaining power λi (and
(1−λi) respectively) with i = 1,2. Thus, the likelihood of termination provisions
decreases with the seller’s bargaining power.
Although we consider only the case in which the seller has an alternative
bargaining partner at the second stage, an extension to the case in which both
players have an outside option is straightforward and leads to analogous results.
With this extension it is possible to also determine conditions under which seller
and/or buyer liquidated damages will be negotiated. The direction of the net
eﬀect of the respective fees is then determined by their relative surpluses.12
12See Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2007) for details.
162.3 Eﬃciency of the deal
The following corollary shows that in the above scenario liquidated damages
will be included in an exclusive contract, even if the surplus of the deal under
consideration is higher than in the respective expected outside option. Moreover,
given the sequence of negotiations, if liquidated damages are paid, the oﬀer will
always be the same at the two stages. This implies that the seller is equally well
oﬀ, even when striking the deal with the less eﬃcient buyer.
Corollary 1 Suppose λi > λj.
i) The contract will include liquidated damages, even with the more eﬃcient
buyer Bj, whenever πi < πj <
αi
αjπi.
ii) A contract with a less eﬃcient buyer Bi will ensure the same (highest
possible) oﬀer for the seller as a contract with the more eﬃcient buyer Bj, if





αj ≷ 1 for λi ≶ λj. For part i) see Proposition 1. Result ii)
comes from the fact that, in equilibrium, the seller must be indiﬀerent between
the deals at the two stages.
If the seller has an attractive outside option he agrees to pay a fee to the buyer
to be able to breach the contract. In this context liquidated damages are a rent
that the buyer can extract, and the seller is willing to pay, in order to enable a
higher oﬀer from another buyer. Note that the seller does not have an advantage
if he can decide which of the two buyers to contact ﬁrst.
2.4 The eﬀects of bargaining power and outside options
on liquidated damages
If the negotiations are inﬂuenced by the outside option as stated in Proposition 1,
in equilibrium, both, liquidated damages and the respective oﬀers, are functions
of the relative bargaining power of the players, as well as of the value of the
outside options. The greater the bargaining power of a seller, the greater his
share of the surplus. Moreover, the seller is interested to pay lower liquidated
damages in case of contract breach.
Analyzing comparative static properties of the equilibrium oﬀers, we conclude
the following corollary:
17Corollary 2 (i) If the expected surplus from the outside option with Bi is suﬃ-
ciently high, i.e., αiπi ≤ πj ≤
αi
αjπi, liquidated damages tj paid to buyer Bj are a
decreasing function of the seller’s bargaining power while the accepted oﬀer xi of
buyer Bi (with i  = j) is an increasing function of the seller’s bargaining power.
(ii) If the expected surplus from the outside option with Bi is suﬃciently higher
than that with Bj, i.e., λiπi ≤ πj ≤ αiπi, liquidated damages tj = (1 − λj)(πj −
λiπi) paid to buyer Bj are a decreasing function of the seller’s bargaining power
with buyer Bj, while the accepted oﬀer of buyer Bi is independent of the seller’s
bargaining power.
Proof. For Part (i), note that αi is an increasing function of λi for i = 1,2. Part
(ii) is obvious.
Furthermore, we can consider the impact of diﬀerences in the players’ bar-
gaining power in the deal under consideration and the bargaining power in the
expected outside option negotiations. Analyzing comparative static properties of
(10), (11), (12), and (13) with respect to the relative level of bargaining power in
the two deals, we conclude the following corollary:
Corollary 3 The larger the relative bargaining power of the seller in the seller’s
outside option negotiations with Bi, the lower will be the liquidated damages tj
that the seller has to pay to buyer Bj.
Proof. See the arguments in the Appendix.
An increase in bargaining power is beneﬁcial. Interestingly, the result holds
irrespective of whether bargaining power at the second-stage negotiations is lower
or higher (in absolute terms) than thebargaining power in ﬁrst-stage negotiations.
Moreover, this eﬀect is stronger the larger the bargaining power of the seller at
the ﬁrst stage.
The eﬀect of the value of the outside option on the negotiations is rather
straightforward. We see that the higher the outside option, the more likely will
the players agree to include liquidated damage rules. Furthermore, liquidated
damages are ﬁrst increasing in the outside option and then decreasing. This
property is summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 4 (i) If the expected surplus from the outside option with Bj is suf-
ﬁciently high, i.e.,
αi
αjπi ≤ πj < α
−1
j πi, liquidated damages ti are an increasing
function of the seller’s outside option πj.
18(ii) If the expected surplus from the outside option with Bj is suﬃciently
higher, i.e., α
−1
j πi ≤ πj ≤ λ
−1
j πi, liquidated damages ti are a decreasing function
of the seller’s outside option πj.
Proof. Inspection of (11) and of (13) reveals these properties.
Even when including liquidated damage rules, the less eﬃcient buyer cannot
protect the deal. Liquidated damages are a rent this buyer can extract from
the more eﬃcient outside option deal. If the expected surplus from the outside
option is suﬃciently high, but not too high, liquidated damage rules serve the
purpose of fully extracting all surplus from the outside option deal. The higher
the surplus in that deal, the larger the fee that has to be paid. This is reﬂected in
the ﬁrst part of Corollary 4. If the surplus from the outside option is suﬃciently
high, such that agreement to liquidated damages with the less eﬃcient buyer can
only be ensured by oﬀering the full surplus, this buyer will no longer be able to
extract all remaining surplus from the outside option deal and liquidated damages
will decrease. The rent is the smaller the closer the actual oﬀer is to the Nash
bargaining solution in the outside deal. Obviously, this diﬀerence is decreasing
in the outside option surplus.
3 No-shop clause as an additional contractual
agreement
Now consider the situation in which the ﬁrst buyer can add a clause to the con-
tract that restricts the seller from seeking other oﬀers and agreements: a so called
no-shop clause.13 While overly restrictive clauses may be rejected by the courts,
the prohibition to sign another contract is frequently assumed to be reasonable.
For our strategic situation this implies that in Figure 1 the last stage disappears,
because by signing an agreement with buyer B2 the ﬁrst agreement with B1 is
automatically breached. Moreover, the seller can not negotiate liquidated dam-
ages when signing a contract with B2, as the seller cannot fall back on Buyer
13Such clauses are more restrictive than exclusive agreements as treated in the previous
section. In the previous section contracts were exclusive in the sense of Diamond and Maskin
(1979) and Aghion and Bolton (1987), where a contract is an agreement to carry out a single
project, or Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) where the contract binds the seller to sell his
products to a single buyer. Under a no-shop clause, a party (in our case the seller) is forbidden
from taking any action, such as seeking or considering an alternative, possibly higher oﬀer,
which would render the consummation of the agreement less likely.
19B1’s oﬀer x1. The contract at the second stage will not be terminated once it is
signed.
The equations to determine the decisions x2 and b2 at node M are given by
(1) and (2) with q = 0. Suppose ﬁrst that δx2 > x1 holds. Solving simultaneously
for x2 and b2 leads to the following outcomes:
x2 = λ2(π2 − t1)
b2 = (1 − λ2)(π2 − t1)
Suppose now that the contract of Stage 1 represents a relevant outside option,
hence δx2 ≤ x1 ≤ π2 − t1. In this case the solution is:
b2 =
(1 − λ2)(t1 − π2) + x1(1 − λ2)
δλ2 − 1
x2 =
λ2(t1 − π2)(1 − δ) − x1(1 − λ2)
δλ2 − 1
and with δ = 1 :
x2 = x1
b2 = π2 − x1 − t1
Hence, we can now summarize the second stage decisions. The oﬀer at Stage 2
(with δ = 1) will be:
x2 =
 
Max{x1,λ2(π2 − t1)} if λ1π1 ≤ π2 − t1,
0 else.
At the ﬁrst stage, S and B1 anticipate the second stage outcome. Suppose ﬁrst
that δ1x1 ≤ x2 and that δx2 < x1 ≤ π2 −t1 such that x2 = x1. Solving (6) to (9)
for q = 1 for the ﬁrst stage values leads to:
x1 = α2π2
b1 = π1 − α2π2
t1 = (1 − α2)π2.








It is straightforward to check that the upper bound is always larger than π1 for
λ1,λ2 ∈ [0,1], while the lower bound is smaller than π1 if λ2 > 1 − λ1. If (14) is
not satisﬁed, the analysis is analogous to that in the previous section, such that
we can summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose the realization of utilities is postponed until all stages
are completed. At the ﬁnal stage the seller will be confronted with the following
contracts:
(x1,t1) = (λ1π1,0) if 0 ≤ π2 <
λ1
α2π1;
(x1,t1) = (α2π2,(1 − α2)π2) if
λ1
α2π1 ≤ π2 < α
−1
2 π1
(x1,t1) = (π1,(1 − λ1)(π1 − λ2π2)) and x2 = π1 if α
−1
2 π1 ≤ π2 < λ
−1
2 π1
x2 = λ2π2 if λ
−1
2 π1 ≤ π2
In equilibrium, the seller will sign a contract with B2 if π2 > α
−1
2 π1, else with B1.
Hence, the ﬁrst stage buyer can use liquidated damages in combination with
a no-shop clause to protect the deal and prevent the seller to negotiate with
the (possibly even more eﬃcient) second buyer. The diﬀerence to a situation
without such a clause is, as discussed before, that with a no-shop clause the
seller chooses a contract that includes liquidated damages whenever
λ1
α2π1 ≤ π2 <
α
−1
2 π1. Moreover, there is no range of values for π2 for which the second buyer
oﬀers his entire surplus in order to extract some of the rents generated by B1
and S. This is because the seller automatically terminated the contract with B1
when signing a contract with B2. S would thus not terminate the contract with
B2. Hence, even when facing a more eﬃcient buyer at the second stage, i.e. if
π1 < π2 < α
−1
2 π1, the seller would not breach the contract at the ﬁrst stage, and,
moreover, would also agree to liquidated damage rules at the ﬁrst stage, as this
ensures him a better oﬀer from the ﬁrst buyer.
Interestingly, when we allow for sequential negotiations, in extension to the
results of Diamond and Maskin (1979), Aghion and Bolton (1987), and Simpson
and Wickelgren (2007), exclusivity agreements in combination with liquidated
damage rules are not enough to exclude more eﬃcient buyers. Only when we
additionally allow the ﬁrst stage negotiation partners to restrict the seller from
21seeking further oﬀers, we ﬁnd ‘naked’ exclusion. Hence, a no-shop clause is
(within limits and in combination with liquidated damage rules) an eﬀective deal
protection device.
4 Application to mergers and acquisitions
The results derived in the previous sections can straightforwardly be applied
to the context of mergers. Most mergers that are announced by public targets
are based on a preliminary merger agreement, signed by the target management,
which still has to be approved by the shareholders. Such agreements often include
liquidated damages referred to as ‘termination fees’, payable by the target to the
bidder in cash, in the event that the target cancels the agreement to accept a
competing (bust-up) bid.14 Practitioners agree that termination fee provisions
“have become the most hotly negotiated provisions in these acquisitions” (Kling
et al. (1997)) and that they are often expected in merger negotiations (Levy
(2002)). In the last two decades Delaware courts repeatedly took a critical, but
at times also generous stance on termination fees.15 The central question is why
target managers voluntarily agree on termination fees, which inevitably lead to
a decrease in shareholder value if the target accepts a bust-up bid.
An agency-related answer is that self-serving incumbent managers use termi-
nation fees to lock into bidders who maximize their personal utility (see Kahan
and Klausner (1996)). This concern explains the signiﬁcant judicial attention to
termination fees in conjunction with alleged shareholder coercion and breach of
target management’s ﬁduciary duties. All the more so as termination fees are a
popular contractual device in mergers and acquisitions.16
In contrast to the agency perspective, the current theoretical literature also
oﬀers shareholder oriented explanations for termination provisions. The cost com-
14Similar contracting devices are ‘lockups’ that grant the incumbent bidder a call option on
the target’s shares or assets, exercisable in the event that the target terminates the merger
agreement.
15Prominent cases include Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum (493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)),
Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings (506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)), Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc (637 A.2d 34 (1993)) and Brazen v. Bell Atlantic
(695 A.2d 43 (1997)).
16Depending on the sample and period of observation up to 79% of the analyzed merger
agreements include termination fees and up to 29% include lockup options. See Boone and
Mulherin (2007a), Bates and Lemmon (2003), Oﬃcer (2003), and Burch (2001).
22pensation approach assumes that potential acquires bear bidding-related costs
that decrease competition for the target unless these costs are taken account of
in the form of termination fees. Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) provide such
a model in which targets decide to employ termination fees that directly cor-
respond to exogenously given bidding costs. The commitment approach argues
that termination fees increase the credibility of the target’s claim that the win-
ning bid will not be reneged upon, which can result in generally higher takeover
premiums (Povel and Singh (2006)). Both of these approaches (jointly referred to
as cost/commitment approach) explain termination provisions within an auction
setting.
Recent evidence shows that both auctions and bargaining play a more or
less equally important role in mergers. Boone and Mulherin (2007b) divide the
takeover process into two phases: a private phase before the announcement of a
merger agreement, and a public phase after such an announcement. When taking
the private phase into account, Boone and Mulherin (2007b) ﬁnd that competing
bids are much more common than is publicly observed. In fact, in roughly 50% of
the mergers the target received at least one other competing bid before or after the
merger announcement. The results, however, concurrently support a bargaining
approach to mergers. Bargaining is most prominent in the other 50% of merger
cases, where the targets negotiated with only one interested party throughout the
whole process. Even in tender oﬀers bargaining plays a signiﬁcant role. Comment
and Jarrell (1987) report that four-ﬁfths of all successful cash tender oﬀers are
negotiated between bidders and target managers before expiry.
Despite the importance of bargaining in mergers, the theoretical literature
on termination fees is primarily auction-related and assumes such fees to be ex-
ogenously determined. Our model sheds some light on situations where auctions
are less prominent, or where auctions are followed or accompanied by merger
negotiations.
Applying our model, we assume that a target ﬁrst negotiates with Bidder
1 and then, in a second stage, with Bidder 2. A potential oﬀer from Bidder 2
represents an outside option for the target when negotiating with Bidder 1, and
vice versa.17 The main results of the model contribute the following insights to
the existing theoretical merger literature:
17We purposely do not assume any bidding- or negotiation-related costs. An inclusion of
such costs would not change the qualitative results of our model.
23i) In equilibrium, a deal with the less eﬃcient bidder can lead to equal pre-
miums as attainable from a merger with the eﬃcient bidder. This result
adds to both the agency cost approach and the cost/commitment approach,
where deals with ineﬃcient bidders are considered suboptimal for the share-
holders. According to our model, the target can be in a situation where
it has a choice between the oﬀers from two most eﬃcient bidders. Like
the agency cost approach, bargaining can thus provide an explanation for
acquiror selection, but without compromising target shareholder value. Fur-
ther, in line with the cost/commitment approach, we ﬁnd that merger agree-
ments with the most eﬃcient bidder may also contain a termination fee
clause.
ii) If the diﬀerence between the merger synergies with the two most eﬃcient
bidders is suﬃciently small, the target may obtain the highest premium
by merging with the less eﬃcient bidder. This contra-intuitive result can
be driven by two diﬀerent factors. The ﬁrst factor may be the sequential
procedure, if no-shop clauses are added to the contract. Alternatively, dif-
ferences in relative bargaining power can lead to this outcome, if the seller is
in a better relative bargaining position against the less eﬃcient buyer than
against the more eﬃcient buyer. This result sheds new light on the agency
cost approach, as it provides an alternative rationale for the selection of
less eﬃcient bidders.
iii) Depending on the diﬀerencebetween the merger synergies with the two most
eﬃcient bidders, termination fees can be used either as a deal protection
device or as a rent extraction device. If Bidder 1 has lower merger synergies,
it can use termination fees in combination with a no-shop clause to protect
an early deal, provided the relative diﬀerence to the potential synergies with
Bidder 2 is suﬃciently small. Above a critical value of relative diﬀerences
in synergies, Bidder 1 is unable to protect its oﬀer, but can still use the
termination fee to extract a rent from Bidder 2. In equilibrium, the target
accepts a fee, because it facilitates the negotiation of a higher premium
with Bidder 2 (compared with the Nash bargaining solution without an
oﬀer from Bidder 1). This double role of termination fees combines the
diﬀerent interpretations of the agency cost approach on the one side and of
the cost compensation approach on the other, which consider termination
24fees either to protect inferior deals or to improve prices, respectively.
iv) We ﬁnd that the termination fee decreases with the bargaining power of
the target. If the target has full bargaining power, it would not accept
any termination fee provision at all, i.e. a termination fee of zero. Hence, a
positive termination fee is a sign of some bargaining power on the side of the
bidders, which use the device as deal protection (when combined with a no-
shop clause) or rent extraction. From thetarget’s perspective, a termination
fee indicates that there exists a realistic outside option. Although the target
cannot prevent a termination fee provision, it can use it to negotiate the
maximum premium under the circumstances.
Two assumptions are central to our model. First, we assume that bargaining
is sequential. In contrast to the sequential auction model of Povel and Singh
(2006), the target does not exclude previous bidders from later stages in the
process. This assumption could be satisﬁed in the following two cases.
i) In the ﬁrst case, bargaining could be sequential because the target and Bid-
der 1 do not (yet) know the identity of potential competing bidders (Bidder
2). They may, however, have a common expectation of possible takeover
prices in the market, which may be oﬀered once the currently negotiated
agreement is made public. Bidder 1 may be the only known bidder, or one of
several bidders in a private pre-announcement phase. For example, Bidder
1 could be the winner of an auction in the private phase with whom the tar-
get (re)negotiates the merger agreement in the light of other potential bids
after the public announcement. In line with this, Cramton and Schwartz
(1991) conjecture that targets use termination fees to preserve their abil-
ity to conduct post-auction negotiations without discouraging entry in the
preliminary auction.18
ii) In the second case, bargaining could be sequential, because the target sim-
ply enters exclusive negotiations with Bidder 1. Bidder 2 is known, but ex-
cluded. According to SEC ﬁlings, such exclusivity negotiation agreements
18One example is the acquisition of Instron Corp in 1999, where the target reneged on the
winning bid and solicited new oﬀers from other potential buyers. For details see DEFS14A
SEC ﬁling by Instron on July 23, 1999.
25are quite common in takeover processes.19 Recent merger negotiations be-
tween Barclays Bank and ABN Amro show that exclusivity agreements are
also used by large public ﬁrms. Our model provides one explanation why
targets may have an incentive to enter exclusivity agreements instead of
bargaining multilaterally.
A second central assumption in our model is that the valuation of the tar-
get is, at least in expected terms, known to all parties involved.20 In support
of this notion, Cramton and Schwartz (1991) ﬁnd that targets sometimes con-
duct preliminary auctions to discover the identity as well as the valuation of the
highest-valuing bidder and then negotiate individually with this bidder. Boone
and Mulherin (2007b) also report similar cases. The above-mentioned acquisition
of Instron Corp provides a concrete example: interested bidders were invited to
several rounds of more and more detailed valuations of the target, including due
diligence, after each of which potential acquirors disclosed their updated valuation
in sealed bids.
5 Conclusion
A seller with less than perfect bargaining power will agree to include liquidated
damagerules in a contract if such a contract provides him with a better bargaining
position in future negotiations. Liquidated damages allow less eﬃcient buyers
in sequential bargaining to extract rents from more eﬃcient deals, depending on
whether the contract is terminated or not. In contrastto simultaneous bargaining,
buyer competition has a positive eﬀect on the equilibrium outcome in a sequential
process if the two surpluses are not too diﬀerent in eﬃciency. This may explain
the use of no-shop clauses in negotiations and also provides a rationale for the
protection of deals with less eﬃcient buyers.
Scholarly discussion on the role of termination fees (a speciﬁc example for
liquidated damage rules) for merger contracts is ongoing, empirical evidence is
19A full text keyword search in all DEFM14A SEC ﬁlings (deﬁnitive proxy statements re-
lating to a merger or acquisition) shows that 256 diﬀerent proxy statements mention the word
combination ‘exclusivity agreement’ at least once (in the period from May 2003 to May 2007).
This compares with 110 hits for ‘shareholder agreement’, 297 hits for ‘non-disclosure agree-
ment’, 528 hits for ‘standstill agreement’ and 5646 hits for ‘conﬁdentiality agreement’. The
source of the ﬁles is the EDGAR online archive (www.sec.gov).
20This is a standard assumption in the bargaining literature.
26not undisputed and Delaware court rulings are mixed. Most theoretical models
assume termination fees to be exogenously given and explain them in an auction
setting, either with bidding-related costs or seller commitment. As bargaining
plays a signiﬁcant role in the merger process, we apply our bargaining model to
mergers to analyze the existence and role of termination fees in this context.
We ﬁnd that early buyers can use liquidated damages as a rent extraction or
as a deal protection device. In both cases sellers accept liquidated damages if
they enable them to capture a greater share of the joint surplus.
When liquidated damages are combined with a no-shop clause they are used as
a deal protection device (and thus may lead to ‘naked’ exclusion). It can then be
optimal that agreements with the most eﬃcient buyer contain liquidated damage
rules, but a less eﬃcient buyer may also use protective liquidated damage rules
and still make an oﬀer as high as that of the eﬃcient buyer. Thus, in equilibrium,
the seller may be able to select a less eﬃcient buyer without compromising on
the oﬀer. If buyer surpluses are suﬃciently close, the seller may only obtain
the highest oﬀer by striking an early deal with the less eﬃcient buyer. This
contra-intuitive result serves as an explanation for the use of no-shop clauses and
provides a novel rationale for the selection of a less eﬃcient buyer.
When liquidated damage rules are used as a rent extraction instrument, the
less eﬃcient buyer will not consummate the deal, but he can improve the future
bargaining position of the seller by putting him ‘into play’ with a higher outside
option. In return the seller is willing to accept liquidated damage rules that
extract a rent from the late buyer.
In both roles, liquidated damages decrease with greater bargaining power of
the seller. The existence of liquidated damage rules is a sign of some bargaining
power on the side of the early buyer, but also indicates that there exists a relevant
outside option for the seller.
Most of these results are driven by the sequential process in our bargaining
model. Analogously to Shaked and Sutton (1984), we require that the ’insider’
buyer can always reply with a counter-oﬀer to any oﬀer by the seller, before the
seller switches over to negotiate with an outsider buyer. By this we guarantee that
the seller can never make simultaneous oﬀers to two diﬀerent buyers. Interest-
ingly, a sequential bargaining process can be exploited by the seller to maximize
the equilibrium oﬀer. More generally, Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Houba
and Bennett (1997) show that, under simultaneous bargaining between a seller
27and two buyers, competition between the buyers has no eﬀect on the equilibrium
price, if the seller can threaten to opt out, as they ﬁnd p = max{λ1π1,λ2π2}. In
the proposed sequential negotiation process we show that the equilibrium price
is above the bilateral outcome with the most eﬃcient buyer. Diﬀerent to these
models, we assume that the seller can sign two agreements and then decide at
a third stage which one to breach. This introduces extra power on the side of
the seller, which enables him in some circumstances to get higher oﬀers in equi-
librium, i.e. p ≤ max{π1,π2}. While this is comparable to an auction setting,
asymmetric information in an auction on the side of the buyers shifts some power
back to the buyers, such that p = min{π1,π2}.
The main results of this paper are robust with regard to several modiﬁcations
to the proposed model.21 First, instead of looking at one seller and two buyers,
the model can also be applied to one buyer and two sellers. Here the buyer may
be able to get a higher share of the joint surplus (pay a lower price) by accepting
liquidated damages that are payable to the less eﬃcient seller. Further, we can
allow for two buyers and two sellers such that both ﬁrst-stage players can opt
out and negotiate with an alternative partner at the second stage. Both parties
actually bargain over a single net termination fee, which represents the diﬀer-
ence between the seller’s and the buyer’s termination fee. This modiﬁcation can
provide an explanation of reciprocal liquidated damages, which seem to be quite
common in merger contracts. Hotchkiss et al. (2005) ﬁnd reciprocal termination
fees in 22% of more than 1100 US stock mergers (one-sided target termination
fees accounted for another 34% of these deals).
Second, the agreement in the ﬁrst stage does not have to represent an outside
option in the second stage, but may also be a disagreement point. In contrast
to the outside option, the disagreement point permanently changes the gains of
trade. For example, if a merger announcement in the ﬁrst stage signals that the
target was undervalued, the respective increase in the target’s stand-alone value
represents a disagreement point in the second stage. Even if negotiations in the
second stage break down and target shareholders also vote against the agreement
of the ﬁrst stage, the target still receives the disagreement point in the form of
a permanent revaluation. Empirical studies of canceled mergers, however, ﬁnd a
non-permanent ‘revaluation’ eﬀect that is primarily driven by the anticipation of
21These modiﬁcations are available in Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2007).
28future, higher-valued bids.22 This is more consistent with our premise of outside
options.
Third, in line with the cost compensation approach of the merger theory,
we can also include bidding-related costs in our model by deducting them from
the gains of trade of the parties involved. This may render some agreements
unproﬁtable, but does not change the main results of our analysis qualitatively.
The crucial diﬀerence to auction models with cost compensation is that liquidated
damages are determined by the seller’s marginal revenues and not by the buyer’s
marginal costs. Hence, even when the seller participates in bidding costs, the
primary motivation for including liquidated damages remains unchanged.
With reference to the diﬀerent applications, several aspects of the model are
empirically testable. Speciﬁcally for mergers, the model emphasizes how takeover
premiums and termination fees are inﬂuenced by outside options and by the
bargaining process. For example, if a bust-up oﬀer is accepted and if a termination
fee is paid by the target, we expect that the termination fee decreases in the
diﬀerence between the synergies with the initial bidder and the synergies with
the bust-up bidder.23 Also, if bargaining is sequential - for example, when a target
signs a contract that includes a no-shop clause - we expect a higher likelihood of
termination fees and a higher takeover premium than in simultaneous bargaining
with several bidders. Analogously, similar relations can be hypothesized, e.g., for
prices and cancellation fees determined in real estate negotiations, or bankruptcy
asset purchases.
22See, for example, Bradley et al. (1983) and Davidson et al. (1989).
23We acknowledge that information on joint synergies is hard to obtain and subject to in-
terpretation. In some mergers, however, expected joint synergies are actually reported. For
example, on April 23, 2007 Barclays and ABN Amro announced joint synergies of Euro 3.5bn
by 2010 (of which Euro 2.8bn cost reductions and Euro 0.7bn revenue synergies). See SEC
ﬁling by ABN AMRO Holding N.V.; Commission File Number 001-14624; dp05435e_425.htm.
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Proof of Corollary 3 Assume λj = βλi. For αjπj ≤ πi ≤
αj
αiπj buyer Bi in


















< 0 ∀ β ∈ R.
For λjπj ≤ πi < αjπi buyer Bi in equilibrium receives a fee ti = (1−λi)(πi −
λjπj) which we can rewrite to get ti = (1 − λi)(πi − βλiπj). Diﬀerentiation with
respect toβ leads to:
∂ti
∂β
= −(1 − λi)λi < 0 ∀ β ∈ R.
Hence, the larger the relative bargaining power of the seller in the expected
outside-option negotiations, the lower will be the liquidated damages the seller
has to pay to the buyer.
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Figure 1: The sequence of decisions
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Figure 2: Regions deﬁned by Proposition 1
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